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Abstract
Although current state-of-the-art hate speech detection models achieve praiseworthy
results, these models have shown themselves to be vulnerable to attack. Easy to execute lexical
manipulations such as the removal of whitespace from a given text create significant issues for
word-based hate speech detection models. In this paper, we reproduce the results of five cutting
edge models as well as four significant evasion schemes from prior work. Only a limited amount
of evasion schemes that also maintain readability exists, and this works to our advantage in the
recreation of the original data. Furthermore, we demonstrate that each lexical attack or evasion
scheme can be overcome with our new defense mechanisms with some reducing the
effectiveness of the scheme to 1%. We also propose a new evasion scheme that outperforms the
those in previous work along with a corresponding defense. Using our results as a foundation, we
contend that hate speech detection models can be defended against lexically attacked data
without the need for significant retraining.
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I.Introduction
Armed with the power of anonymity, many groups and individuals abuse social media
tools in order to proliferate messages advocating for violence and suppression of another people.
Such language and its spread across online social networks (OSNs) presents several issues to the
managers of such networks, but there is an inherent issue with rooting out such speech. The
definition and classification of hate speech has not reached a universal consensus. MerriamWebster designates hate speech as language “expressing hatred of a particular group of people”
while the European Union defined it as speech that “spread, incite, promote or justify racial
hatred, xenophobia, antisemitism or other forms of hatred based on intolerance”. There is a
notable distinction between the two definitions above; the latter places an emphasis on hateful
“calls to action” while the former does not. This difference, the “call to action”, typically is the
borderline between merely offensive speech and hateful speech in the eyes of OSN moderators
and admins. Even with this boundary, the problem of classifying hate speech remains a
troublesome one since declaring whether one has crossed the border is still murky. Regardless,
the identification of hate speech a persistent problem for OSN moderators, and due to the sheer
volume of generated content on said networks, manual moderation is infeasible.
Several approaches towards detecting such language have been proposed and recently
developed in order to combat the rise of hate speech. With the spread of social networking
websites, it has become easier than ever to broadcast one’s opinions on whichever topic one may
choose. While the quick dissemination of information through such sites can elicit much good, in
irresponsible or scheming hands, such power can bring about great division and anguish. One
such example of the harm that can come about is the birth of echo chambers on the internet;
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misguided or misinformed people can find themselves trapped in a vicious cycle of ingraining
more and more radical and polarizing sentiments [1].
Hate speech and its prevalence in online social networks have proven to be an ongoing
problem on social media sites such as Facebook and Youtube. While manual user flaggings of
comments or posts can help, the process can be abused to silence opinions one disagrees with.
With the constant stream of content generation, simply employing an army of moderators will
not solve the issue either. Thus, there is a need for an effective and automated system for
identifying hate speech.
Unfortunately, sources of hate can undertake actions to morph their text to evade
detection thus complicating the problem. The inherent goal of morphing text is to introduce
enough noise so that detection models cannot correctly classify phrases and passages as “hateful”
while also maintaining the meaning and readability of the original message. Prior work has
shown that simple modifications such as the removal of whitespace can decimate the accuracy of
state-of-the-art models and that there is a need for some method of defense against these evasion
schemes.
We replicate the results of five cutting edge model architectures from four papers as well
as four lexical attacks presented in a separate paper. In addition, we propose one new attack that
we demonstrate to be more effective than all prior attacks. We show that we can construct a
defense that significantly mitigates the effect of each evasion scheme despite alterations to the
attack method’s parameters. This suggests that evasion schemes are inherently limited by the
need for preserved readability, and one can leverage this property to build appropriate
countermeasures. Our best defenses can all be categorized as a “pre-processing” stage defense;
there is significant difficulty in training hate speech detection models on adversarial data. While
9

we did include one defense of the latter category, we demonstrate the stark performance
difference in the two methods and propose that “pre-processing” stage defenses be built to
address any evasion schemes encountered.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: in Section II we cover related work
and present our motivations. In Section III provide a problem statement and subsequently
propose a solution in Section IV. Section V details and discusses our experimental settings and
results. In Section VI, we conclude this paper and discuss avenues of future work.

II.Related Work
One method of identifying hate speech is to use a rule-based approach where certain
negative words are always flagged to indicate a need for further inspection. Certain words are
statistically identified to appear in manually identified hate speech more than others, and they are
subsequently added to a ruleset to follow. Classification of hate speech is determined by the
construction of a dictionary compiling all “hate” words [2] or through a binary classification of
“benign” or “hate” types [3]. Unfortunately, such approaches are somewhat naive and illequipped to handle slang and symbolism. It should be noted that some of these rule-based
approaches are used in conjunction with other methods to form a more robust solution.
The more generally accepted method of identifying hate speech is the use of machine
learning and deep learning algorithms. This approach more readily handles slang and symbolism
since the models will be trained upon a dataset that includes such words and phrases. Machine
learning and deep learning models built for hate speech detection can fall into one of two
categories, word-based and character-based models. Word-based models rely on extracting
features from n-grams of different tokenized word combinations while character-based models
10

do so from n-grams of characters. Word-based models can also utilize rule-based techniques and
factor in a word’s sentiment or connotation.
Watanabe et al [4] used unigrams along with extracted patterns to develop dictionaries.
They used these dictionaries paired with sentiment, semantic and polarity features with a
machine learning algorithm, “J48graft” to classify speech into binary and ternary classifications.
The researchers made the distinction between hate speech and offensive speech; the ternary
classifier used “hateful”, “offensive”, and “clean” labels.
Rutwandika et al [5] experimented with supervised and unsupervised learning techniques
and a variety of different features for hate speech detection. Unlike [4], the researchers focused
on binary classification. Amongst the methods , naive bayes, logistic regression, svm, decision
tree, and k-means, naive bayes achieved the highest f-1 score when using tf-idf features. [5] also
noted the ineffectiveness of K-means clustering in this problem space; it ranked the worst in
performance in nearly every scenario.
Grondahl et al. [6] utilized new hate speech detection models from four papers
[7][8][9][10] as the basis for testing new evasion schemes. While the five models used from
[7][8][9][10] performed well on their own datasets, [6] noted that performance dropped once
each model trained upon all datasets. Grondahl et al. noted that hate speech detection models fail
to take into account the existence of adversarial examples. Current state of the art hate speech
detection models only consider naive examples that originate from entities that do not attempt to
avoid detection. However, the real world is filled with adversaries who wish to spread hate
speech on a platform while going undetected.
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III. Literature Survey

A. Current Methods and Features

i. Methods
One method of identifying hate speech is to use a rule-based approach where certain
negative words are always flagged to indicate a need for further inspection. Certain words are
statistically identified to appear in manually identified hate speech more than others, and they are
subsequently added to a ruleset to follow. Classification of hate speech is determined by the
construction of a dictionary compiling all “hate” words or through a binary classification of
“benign” or “hate” types. Unfortunately, such approaches are somewhat naive and ill-equipped
to handle slang and symbolism. It should be noted that some of these rule-based approaches are
used in conjunction with other methods to form a more robust solution.
The more generally accepted method of identifying hate speech is the use of machine
learning and deep learning algorithms. This approach more readily handles slang and symbolism
since the models will be trained upon a dataset that includes such words and phrases. Machine
learning and deep learning models built for hate speech detection can fall into one of two
categories, word-based and character-based models. Word-based models rely on extracting
features from n-grams of different tokenized word combinations while character-based models
do so from n-grams of characters. Word-based models can also utilize rule-based techniques and
factor in a word’s sentiment or connotation.
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ii. Definition
There is no agreed upon standard for hate speech detection, several papers contain
significant departures from one another in terms of definitions, classes, features, and architecture
used. This complicates the problem of hate speech detection while underlining how it remains an
actively worked upon challenge.
In the case of definitions, there is no consensus upon what hate speech actually is. The
generic idea consists of language expressing a large degree of hatred of a people, but it becomes
tricky differentiating it from offensive speech. As noted before, the European Union draws the
line at the “call to action”, speech is not considered hateful until it advocates for the suppression
or violence against others. For those who utilize this distinction for the categorization of speech,
the problem turns into a ternary classification situation with benign, hate, and offensive speech
labels [8]. Not everyone abides by this definition however, and in those instances, the line
between hate speech and offensive speech blurs. In other cases, hate speech is divided not by the
severity or by the existence of a “call to action” but rather the areas for attack such as racism and
sexism [7]. Thus, different hate speech detection models do not necessarily compare directly to
one another due to the variations in definitions and classes used. It follows that with different
classes or labels used, these models use quite different datasets as well. With these variations, the
direct evaluation and comparison of different hate speech detection models is difficult.

iii. Features
There is a common thread of features used in addressing hate speech detection. The most
commonly used features consist of Term Frequency Inverse Document Frequency (TF-IDF), bag
of words vectors, n-grams of characters or words, Global Vectors for Word Representation
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(GloVe),. From each of these features, the statistical properties and makeup of hate speech can
be determined. Nobata et al. [11] found that these statistical based features are more effective in
classifying speech than semantic features such as polarity and sentiment. This may be due to how
sentiment based features can be mixed within both benign and hate speech. Benign speech can
contain words that register negatively in sentiment while hateful material can contain words that
register positively. Contrastingly, statistical based features make class associations based on the
appearance of a combination of words or characters within a test class. Despite this issue,
sentiment based features are still commonly paired with statistical based features as seen in Gao
and Huang [12].
a. TF-IDF
TF-IDF or Term Frequency Inverse Document Frequency is a numerical statistic that
reflects the importance of a word or term in a given document. This statistic is primarily based
upon the frequency with which a term appears within a given document; if the term appears
frequently, it presumably holds more importance than terms that do not. Notably, the second
portion of the term, Inverse Document Frequency, reflects that the weight of the frequency of
occurrence is inversely proportional to the amount of times the term appears in other documents.
In short, a term may appear quite frequently while holding no real significance, and one such
example is a common word “the”. This statistic has been used in many hate speech detection
models, ones that are primarily lexical based [5][8][9].
b. Bag of Words
Bag of Words is a representation of text using frequencies with an assortment of words.
This is a surface level feature that reflects the statistical makeup of a given piece of text. It has
14

been used in several works, primarily lexical based models but also some neural network based
models [5][9].
c. N-grams
In a broad sense, n-grams refer to continuous sequences of n items from a document or
given piece of data. Specifically for hate speech detection, these sequences consist of letters or
words. N-grams are utilized by many different hate speech detection models, but in the case of
neural networks, they are typically used to learn word embeddings [7][9][11]. Character based ngrams are suited for handling typos due to majority of n-grams being preserved even with typos.
On the other hand, word based n-grams are better at capturing implicit hate as well as less
computationally intensive to generate. Word based n-grams look to be more popular overall than
character based n-grams for hate speech detection models.
d. GloVe or Word Embeddings
This type of feature consists of representing terms or more usually words as vectors.
These vectors are numerical representations of words or terms in a vector space and are used to
denote whether certain words are closely associated with one another or not. Word embeddings
are primarily used by neural network hate speech detection models since a neural network is
usually required to create them in the first place. Several pre-trained embeddings are available
and used by several papers for their neural networks [9][10][12]. Of note is that these
embeddings rely heavily on proper tokenization, and any variations in spelling will cause a new
vector to be created instead of modifying the original term’s vector.
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e. Semantic Features
While statistic based and surface level features have been used to great effect, models
incorporating these as well as semantic features have shown performance improvements [12].
Semantic features typically revolve around the positive and negative connotations of words or
polarity. Some of these rely upon a pre-built lexicon dictionary to judge whether a given word is
good or bad. It follows that semantic features are useful in aiding hate speech detection because
by nature hate speech should contain more words with negative polarities than benign text. Gao
and Huang [12] showcase the usefulness of semantic features by making chiefly utilizing both
the polarity and a lexicon dictionary in their hate speech detection model along with other
statistical based features. Of note is that semantic features can overlap with one another while
coming from different classes. As an example, hate speech can contain many words with a
positive polarity while expressing a passionate fervor for the condemnation of another group of
people. Meanwhile, benign text that consists of complaints for ordinary problems will contain
many words with negative polarities. This “cross contamination” signifies that semantic features
are not usually linearly separable by class; to our knowledge, no hate speech detection model
uses only semantic features. Semantic features are quite useful in supplementing statistical
feature based models but not that useful on their own.

B. Neural Network Hate Speech Detection Models
Neural Network based methods use neural networks to learn abstract feature
representations of test hate speech data through several stacked layers. Input features consist of
task-specific embeddings learned using FastText, CNNs and LSTMs and other forms of feature
encoding. The goal of these neural network based approaches is to learn new abstract feature
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representations from simple input text. Some of the popular methods used in this category
consist of Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs), Recurrent Neural Networks (RNNs), and
Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM) networks. For the most part, this approach relies upon
character or word n-gram one hot encodings.
Wuclzyn, Thain, and Dixon [7] used a multilayer perceptron (MLP) models, a type of
artificial neural network, in addition to logistic regression models to handle the binary
classification problem. They noted that the MLP models were better at detecting implicit hate
speech as opposed to the logistic regression models.
Badjatiya, Gupta, Gupta, and Varma [9] treated the hate speech detection issue as a
binary classification problem and used a variety of deep neural networks to attempt to address it.
Amongst the various features, tf-idf, bag of words vectors and embeddings learned, and models,
FastText, CNNs, and LSTMs, LSTMs using random embeddings and Gradient Boosting
Decision Trees (GDBT) performed the best. The authors reasoned that this may be due to the
inherent nature of LSTMs. LSTMs are a subset of RNNs and both retain memory of past events
through use of an internal state. However, LSTMs do not suffer from an issue that RNNs do that
prevents them from propagating information far into the future. The authors noted that the
random embeddings version outperformed the pre-trained versions which may be due to the need
for backpropagation for the associated GDBTs to learn embeddings for the task [9].
Contrastingly, Zhang, Robinson, and Tepper [10] used a combination approach of CNN
and RNN combination architecture to classify hate speech. Specifically, a Gated Recurrent Unit
(GRU), a type of RNN, was used in conjunction with a CNN. Recurrent Neural Networks suffer
from the vanishing gradient problem which prevents the propagation of information into the
distant future. Gated Recurrent Units were developed to address the issue and are often paired
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with Convolutional Neural Networks, networks that apply convolution and pooling operations.
In this case, the purpose is to have the CNNs extract co-occurring word n-grams as patterns
while having the Gated Recurrent Units retain past pattern information to give context. The
authors concluded that while both LSTM networks and the combination of CNNs and GRUs can
identify hate speech comparably well to one another, the training time for the combination is
significantly less than that of the LSTMs [10].

C. Context Aware Hate Speech Detection Models
A new type of approach to hate speech detection involves the leveraging of context as a
semantic feature. Hate groups often attempt to avoid detection by the use of words with hidden
meaning. In addition, current events give background information that can turn seemingly
innocuous text into hate speech once considering the context. There is relatively a small amount
of work done in this niche area compared to the generic version of hate speech, but some papers
have identified it grondahl et al. as an area for future work.
To our best knowledge, only one significant work has been published in the area of
context aware hate speech detection. Gao and Huang [12] define context as any information not
included within the original text itself. In addition to typical word and character n-grams, Gao
and Huang utilized lexicon derived features such as polarity and emotion as well as context
features consisting of usernames and article titles. The authors created a corpus of Fox News
comments that were annotated according to strict guidelines; this included context features and is
purported to be the first of its kind.
Gao and Huang [12] tested both logistic regression and bi-directional LSTM models
while treating hate speech detection as a binary classification problem. They found that in both
models’ cases, there was an improvement in F-1 score by using the additional context
18

information. The authors noted the pros of both model approaches. Logistic regression makes
good use of character n-grams which helps with capitalizations and misspellings while LSTMs
can capture the hidden and subtle meanings of implicit hate speech. To maximize usage of both
models strengths, the authors combined the two into an ensemble model which yielded
significant performance increases over the use of a single model.
IV. Problem Statement
Grondahl et al. [6] created six different evasion schemes to morph text; these schemes
reliably diminished the effective of each detection model while preserving the meaning of the
original text. The six attacks proposed fall into one of three categories: word modifications,
whitespace manipulation, and benign word insertion. Word modifications are simple changes to
the hate speech text, and they include simple typos or deterministic LEETSPEAK where letters
are exchanged for numbers. Whitespace manipulation revolves around the removal or insertion
of spaces within a given text to throw off word-based models. Finally, benign word insertion is
the addition of normal or positive words not normally associated with hate speech, such as
“love”, in order to fool the model. These attacks require essentially no training for the average
person to use, and [6] found that the combination of whitespace removal and benign word
insertion zeroed out the F1 scores for many of the state-of-the-art models. The following
passages detail the attacks addressed in this paper along with our newly proposed attack.
The typo attack used in [6] consists of a single swapping of letters within the middle of a
word. This was done to more effectively trick spell checkers while also maintaining readability
and the original meaning of the text. The preservation of readability and meaning must be taken
into account for the creation of any lexical attack; fooling detection models can be done easily if
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the new text loses all meaning. In this case, the evasion scheme relies on previous cognitive
research that determined single character swaps have the least impact on retaining readability.
Whitespace removal converts a given piece of text into one single chunk of characters.
This attack greatly hinders the effectiveness of word-based models due to their reliance on
proper tokenization of words. Word-based models rely on word-embeddings; if fed improperly
tokenized data, these models fail to leverage these embeddings. In this case, such models treat
text with removed whitespace as new words with no particular associations thereby allowing
adversaries to evade detection. Conversely, character-based models better handle this issue;
removing whitespace does cause issues in terms of the separation of words, but the majority ngram character combinations remain the same.
Benign word insertion attacks, more specifically the word “love”, involve the random
placement of a positive or neutral word into a text. [6] notes that this attack affected both wordbased and character-based models comparably. The effectiveness of this evasion schemes comes
from an asymmetric problem regarding the insertion of material. Inserting hateful material into a
benign or positive piece of text results in the creation of hateful material while the reverse,
inserting positive material into hateful material, does not yield positive material. However,
detection models do not take this into account and thus significantly decrease in performance
when faced with the evasion scheme.
Our newly proposed attack, character boundary appending (CBA), adds patterns of
random letters to the edges of a word. This attack maintains a high amount of readability due to
humans’ ability to effectively parse out original word as can be seen in the following example:
“Jack and Jill went up the xxxhillxxx”
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This attack can be extremely customized with a length of the patterns, pool of letters to draw
from, and the balance of the attack. Balance in this case refers to the ratio of letters to append to
the left of the word versus that of the right of the word. In the interest of maintaining as much
readability as possible, patterns of multiple consonants are used to minimize the chance of a
random word being created within the appendings.
In summary, hate speech detection models are not well equipped to handle adversarial
examples originating from entities that wish to evade detection. These attacks are effective and
easy to execute. We aim to address this security gap of these models and propose several new
methods to aid these detection systems against evasion schemes.

V. Proposed Solution
The following sections cover the details of proposed defenses against the aforementioned
attacks. We begin with a brief overview of the datasets and the models used. Then, we cover our
proposed defense schemes and attack replication process.

A. Models and Datasets
This section describes the models and datasets used in the replication the work conducted
by Grondal et al. [6]. The models, named W, T1, T2, and T3, and datasets are sorted by which
paper they originally came from.
Wulczyn et al. [7] utilized the W dataset comprising of Wikipedia edit comments; these
comments were separated into personal attacks and ordinary speech. These researchers used both
multilayer perceptron (MLP) models and logistic regression (LR) with n-gram features. The ngram features were of both character and word types; the models with the former outperformed
21

those of that latter which is why [6] chose to use both MLP and LR character models over their
word-based counterparts. The MLP and LR models are the only character-based models used in
both our experiments and those of [6].
Davidson et al. developed the T1 dataset which labelled speech in one of three classes,
hate speech, offensive, and ordinary. The text comprises of tweets gathered from hatebase.org
and gathered using searches for common phrases associated with hate speech. [6] conflates the
two labels, hate speech and offensive, when using the T1 dataset due to the lack of ternary
classification capability of every detection model used. Our use of the T1 dataset was modified
to follow that of [6], but for clarity’s sake we only will refer to the modified dataset as T1 and
make no mention of the unmodified version. Davidson et al. [1] created a LR word-based model
to perform ternary classification with great success.
Badjatiya et al. worked with the T2 dataset which also contained three class labels, but
conversely to that of the T1 dataset, these labels consisted of “sexism”, “racism”, and “neither”.
Similar to the T1 dataset, we replicated the conflation of the sexism and racism labels done by
Grondahl et al. [6]. The T2 dataset comprises of tweets as well, and the Badjatiya et al. classified
them using a long short-term memory (LSTM) network. LSTM models are particularly useful in
text classification due to their ability to retain information from the past better than recurrent
neural networks (RNNs) do. RNNs tend to lose information that is too far away due to the
vanishing gradient problem.
Zhang et al. utilized both the T1 as well as their own new dataset, T3. In addition, the
researchers also combined the hate speech and offensive labels into one class. The T3 dataset
contains about 2400 tweets with the hateful portion specifically attacking muslims and refugees.
Zhang et al. created a model based on a mix of convolutional neural networks (CNNs) and
22

RNNs. CNNs are typically useful for extracting features while RNNs retain information from the
past. The team used gated recurrent units (GRUs) which are a type of RNN that does not face the
vanishing gradient issue that normal RNNs do. The CNN and GRU hybrid model approach
achieves comparable results to a LSTM, but they only use up a fraction of the resources a LSTM
requires.

B. Proposed Defenses
We propose defenses that fall into one of two categories, pre-processing and retraining.
Pre-processing defenses modify incoming data before they reach the model and attempt to
recreate the original text. Contrastingly, retraining addresses text morphs through training the
model on pre-attacked data. To keep things fair, we design our defenses to be as generic as
possible to simultaneously address variations on the attack.

C. Pre-processing Defenses
The first pre-processing defense we propose, word segmentation no redo (WSNR),
addresses the whitespace removal attack through separating the one large chunk of words back
into separate words. Word segmentation, the separation of words without whitespace, has been
thoroughly studied in itself, and many python libraries that support this function are available.
Note that the api used to carry out this defense significantly impacts results; given the nature of
the data, word segmentation functions may yield unsatisfactory results if they cannot deal with
typos.
Our second proposed defense, word balance no redo (WBNR), reverses the typo attack
described beforehand. Since the typo attack creates an error in two letters of a word, typical spell
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checkers do not properly rectify the mistake [6]. Since we know the effects of the typo attack, we
determined that we only need to swap back the letters involved. The algorithm is defined as
follows:
1) Match the attacked word to entries inside a dictionary based on the same length of
characters
2) Of those matching words, select those with the same outside characters
3) Of those matching words, select those with the same ascii values
4) Of the remaining, select the word that differs with the attacked word by one swap of
letters. If no word can be found, return failure status.
Our proposed defense can handle any variations on the typo attack so long as they do not swap
more than three letters or modify the outside letters. However, we do not believe that an attack
that violates the above two principles would retain a high level of readability.
Thirdly, we present a defense, good grammar no redo, that defends against perhaps the
most difficult attack to detect, benign word insertion. The defense first comprises of flagging any
words that violate grammar rules. This is done to yield a list of words for polarity checking and
is effective versus the benign word insertion attack due to the inherent properties of word
insertion. Insertion of a word into a sentence, especially non-adjectives and non-adverbs, most
likely cause a break in grammatical sense. In the event that the insertion of the word does not
cause a violation of a grammatical rule, the meaning of the text will then change. Since we know
that the benign word insertion attack will insert a word of neutral or positive connotation, we can
address it by removing the words with such a polarity from the list of words compiled
beforehand.
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Our fourth proposed defense, vowel search no redo (VSNR), addresses our newly created
attack, character boundary appending. The tricky part in addressing this attack is derived from its
large amount of customization; an attacker can easily switch between appending characters in a
balanced manner to appending them only on one side while not losing readability and meaning.
In order to address this attack, we factored in the limitations of text morphings, the need for
preservation of readability and meaning. Given these limits, we know that characters appended
to a word must not create a new word lest it violate the aforementioned clause. Apart from this,
we also know that every word in the english language, barring some exceptions such as “tv” and
“dr.”, has a vowel. Thus, we formed our VSNR defense to search for words that can be found in
a dictionary based on the position of vowels within an attacked text. Since the characters
appended should not form a word either within themselves or in conjunction with the original
text, we do not have to worry about the presence of any newly created words. Thus, the longest
word found with based on vowel positional searching should be the original word itself.

D. Training Defenses
The first retraining defense we propose attempts to address the whitespace removal
attack. Whitespace removal training (WSRT) involves training the models on text data with
whitespaces already removed. Any new test data must also have any whitespaces removed from
the text, even if the test data has not been attacked. Failure to do so will cause a performance
decrease since the models are not trained on clean data and thus do not recognize whitespaces
properly. This defense is only applicable to character-based models due to the issues with word
tokenization for word-based models. An initial test backed these claims which is why we did not
bother applying this defense to non-character-based models.
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Our second retraining defense, clean spelling training (CST), addresses the typo attack.
This defense is more of a mix of pre-processing and training as opposed to just training. The
defense involves flagging all words that are unable to be recognized, mapping them to one word
with correct spelling, and compiling this all into a dictionary. Then, the model is trained upon the
training data that has been preprocessed to switch any incorrectly spelled words to their one
word based upon the dictionary built previously. Any test data will also have any words found in
the dictionary replaced with the singular correct spelling.

VI. Performance and Results
We performed four attacks on each of the model-dataset combinations; with seven total
combinations, this yielded 28 attacks. In addition, we used two variations of our newly proposed
attack along with two combination attacks to end with a total of 56 attacks. For each attack, we
applied the appropriate defenses in separate runs.
Due to ethical concerns, [6] decided not to release any of the code associated with the
generation of attacks. Thus, we recreated the attacks empirically and selected the settings that
yielded the most similar results to those found in [6].
Our experiments were conducted using the sci-kit learn python package and keras, a
tensorflow api. We used 5-fold cross validation and applied attacks to the given datasets before
they were fed into the pipeline to the models themselves. Any pre-processing defenses were run
in the pre-processing stage, and similarly, any training defenses had the model-dataset
combinations trained on the pre-attacked data before receiving any test data. As in [6], we used a
macro averaged F-1 score as our performance metric of choice. The following sections detail the
experimental results based on the attack being addressed.
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A. Typos
TABLE I. Macro Averaged F-1 Scores for Model, Dataset Combinations under Typo Attack and
Applied Defenses
Model, Dataset

Orig.

Typo

WBNR vs Typo

CST vs Typo

LR Char, W

0.76

0.62

0.76

0.71

LR Word, T1

0.49

0.29

0.48

0.45

MLP Char, W

0.74

0.58

0.73

0.68

CNN + GRU, T1

0.44

0.32

0.44

0.38

CNN + GRU, T2

0.78

0.24

0.77

0.71

CNN + GRU, T3

0.70

0.27

0.69

0.53

LSTM

0.70

0.42

0.70

0.63

While typo attacks can significantly impact the performance of hate speech detection
models, apply either the pre-processing or training defense can significantly reduce the
effectiveness of the attack. In this case, the WBNR defense outperforms the CST defense greatly.
This can be attributed to how the WBNR defense recreates the original input data with great
reliability while the CST defense may encounter new typos in the training data that it has not
built an entry for.
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Figure 1. Graph of Macro Averaged F-1 Scores for Model, Dataset Combinations under Typo
Attack and Applied Defenses

B. Whitespace Removal
TABLE II. Macro Averaged F-1 Scores for Model, Dataset Combinations under Whitespace
Removal Attack and Applied Defenses

WSNR vs WS WSRT vs WS
WS Removal
Removal
Removal

Model, Dataset

Orig.

LR Char, W

0.76

0.58

0.62

0.64

LR Word, T1

0.49

0.00

0.44

-

MLP Char, W

0.74

0.56

0.66

0.65

CNN + GRU, T1

0.44

0.00

0.40

-

CNN + GRU, T2

0.78

0.00

0.68

-

28

CNN + GRU, T3

0.70

0.01

0.64

-

LSTM

0.70

0.00

0.67

-

Figure 2. Graph of Macro Averaged F-1 Scores for Model, Dataset Combinations under
Whitespace Removal Attack and Applied Defenses
Whitespace removal completely breaks all word-based models while also greatly
diminishing the character-based models’ performance. [6] suggests that the character-based
models lose access to all n-grams concerning whitespaces as the reason why character-based
models suffer performance issues. Regarding the word-based models, correct tokenization is key
for word-based models to properly utilize their pre-trained embeddings. The removal of
whitespace zeroes out an essential part of these models; in the case of the CNN + GRU model,
we observed the embedding matrix to only consist of 0’s.
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Unlike the case of typos, the training defense outperformed that of the pre-processing
one. However, the performance increase was not substantial; the word segmentation defense
yielded F-1 scores within 2% of the training defense’s. Note that we chose to only apply the
WSRT defense to the character based models since word-based models will fail when using
whitespace removed data. The WSNR defense performs admirably well and holds an advantage
over the WSRT defense in that it is applicable to any model regardless of whether it is wordbased or character-based. We utilized several different word segmentation apis and found that
results differed greatly due to natural typos encountered. The symspell api is able to address
spelling errors and yielded the best results which is why we chose it for our final WSNR
implementation. We conclude that our defenses against this attack can significantly reduce the its
effectiveness although we do note that the pre-processing version could yield better results with a
better word segmentation api.

C. Benign Word Insertion
TABLE III. Macro Averaged F-1 Scores for Model, Dataset Combinations under “Love”
Insertion Attack and Applied Defenses

Model, Dataset

Orig.

"Love"

GGNR vs "Love"

LR Char, W

0.76

0.55

0.74

LR Word, T1

0.49

0.43

0.47

MLP Char, W

0.74

0.51

0.72

CNN + GRU, T1

0.44

0.02

0.40

CNN + GRU, T2

0.78

0.51

0.73

CNN + GRU, T3

0.70

0.17

0.68

LSTM

0.70

0.14

0.68
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Figure 3. Graph of Macro Averaged F-1 Scores for Model, Dataset Combinations under “Love”
Insertion Attack and Applied Defenses
The GGNR defense performed extremely well in addressing the benign word insertion
attack. We chose to use “love” as our word of choice due to its nature as not being associated
with “hateful” speech. We did not develop a training defense for this attack due to the
customizability of the insertion attack. A model would have to be trained on every non-hate
word, but doing so would cause all such words to lose proper meaning. Specifically training
versus a “known” word such as “love” was deemed to be unfair as it would require us defenders
to have too much knowledge of the attack and defeat our goal of making these defenses as
generic as possible.
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D. Character Boundary Appending
TABLE IV. Macro Averaged F-1 Scores for Model, Dataset Combinations under Different CBA
Attacks and Applied Defense

Model, Dataset Orig. F1 CBA (I, 2)

CBA (I, 2) CBA (B, All)

VSNR vs CBA (B,
ALL)

LR Char, W

0.76

0.53

0.64

0.13

0.74

LR Word, T1*

0.49

0.39

0.39

0.00

0.47

MLP Char, W

0.74

0.58

0.68

0.15

0.71

CNN + GRU,
T1*

0.44

0.36

0.36

0.00

0.42

CNN + GRU,
T2

0.78

0.58

0.58

0.00

0.77

CNN + GRU,
T3

0.70

0.45

0.45

0.00

0.7

LSTM

0.70

0.39

0.39

0.00

0.69

Our proposed character boundary appending attack outperformed all other attacks under
the correct customization. The CBA affected both character-based and word-based models and
markedly decreased the F-1 scores regardless of settings. The LSTM model took the largest hit in
performance with a 30% drop in F-1 score. For word-based models, the CBA performed equally
whether it had an imbalanced or balanced setting. We attribute this to the word-based models not
being concerned so much by how the attacked words were structured but rather the existence of
an unknown word. Contrastingly, character-based models performed worse with the balanced
version of the CBA attack. We suggest this may result from a how the n-grams concerning the
affected word’s boundaries are no longer usable in the case of a balanced attack. A balanced
attack completely surrounds the word with characters while an imbalanced attack has the
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potential to append only to one side. When applied to all words, the attack zeroes out all wordbased models and reduces the F-1 score of character models by more than 50%. This version of
the attack floods the input text with too many characters for the character-based models to
properly build classifiers. The random nature of the appendings force any word-based models to
be unable to use any embeddings, because the likelihood of the same word being appended in the
same manner is quite small.

Figure 4. Graph of Macro Averaged F-1 Scores for Model, Dataset Combinations under
Different CBA Attacks and Applied Defense
The defense we built for this CBA attack performed very well and nearly completely
reversed the effects of the CBA attack. VSNR worked regardless of the settings for CBA, and we
argue that this highlights the importance of generality in a defense. This defense reduced the
effectiveness of CBA to a maximum of 3% in the case of the multilayer perceptron model.
Similarly to the benign word insertion defense, we did not create a training defense for this
attack due to its random nature.
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E. Combined attacks
TABLE V. Macro Averaged F-1 Scores for Model, Dataset Combinations under Combination
Attacks

Orig. F1

Whitespace Removal +
Love

Whitespace Removal + CBA (B,
All)

LR Char, W

0.76

0.51

0.04

LR Word, T1*

0.49

0.00

0.00

MLP Char, W

0.74

0.49

0.02

CNN + GRU, T1*

0.44

0.00

0.00

CNN + GRU, T2

0.78

0.00

0.00

CNN + GRU, T3

0.7

0.01

0.00

LSTM

0.7

0.00

0.00

Model, Dataset

We combined two of our strongest attacks at our disposal, CBA and whitespace removal,
and compare it to the strongest combined attack from [6]. The pairing of whitespace removal and
our new attack nearly zeroes out the F-1 scores in both word-based and character-based models
thereby outperforming the “love” insertion and whitespace removal combination attack.
Use of a combination of attacks allows us to simultaneously affect two properties that hate
speech detection models rely upon, word tokenization and statistical makeup. In the case of word
tokenization, removing whitespaces completely breaks word-based models as seen in Table 2.
The evasion scheme causes word-based models to lose access to previously generated word
embeddings since each new affected text will be treated as an unknown word. CBA further
exacerbates this issue for word-based models by appending random patterns to the outsides of
words. Furthermore, CBA significantly alters the statistical makeup of affected text. By doing so,
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the n-grams used by character-based models build false associations to a class thereby
introducing larger errors. In addition, the removal of whitespaces is suggested by [6] to have
further adverse effects on these n-grams. N-grams including whitespaces are used to signify the
starts and ends of words, and the removal of whitespace significantly impedes a model’s ability
to determine these boundaries that are large factor.

Figure 5. Graph of Macro Averaged F-1 Scores for Model, Dataset Combinations under
Combination Attack

Classification of Evasion Schemes
Although we may have an effective defense for each attack, properly applying them is
another problem. Some defenses such as GGNR may cause a false positive if applied to neutral
text which highlights the need for proper classification before applying the defense. Thus, there
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is a need to classify which evasion scheme has been applied to a text before using a defense. To
our knowledge, this problem has not been addressed in any other published work.
TABLE IV. Macro Averaged Precision, Recall, F-1 Scores of Model, Feature Type
Combinations For Lexical Evasion Scheme Classification

Model, Dataset

Macro Averaged Metric
Precision

Recall

F-1

Random Forest, Engineered

0.4012

0.3953

0.3982

Random Forest, Char TF-IDF

0.9827

0.9826

0.9825

AdaBoost, Engineered

0.4859

0.4038

0.4411

0.7092

0.7427

0.7014

Naive Bayes, Char TF-IDF

0.9557

0.9543

0.9543

SGD, Char TF-IDF

0.9799

0.9797

0.9797

SVM, Char TF-IDF

0.9847

0.9846

0.9846

KNN, Char TF-IDF

0.8705

0.8615

0.8637

Multilayer Perceptron, Char TF-IDF

0.9825

0.9824

0.9824

Logistic Regression, Engineered

0.4206

0.4239

0.4222

Logistic Regression, Engineered RFE

0.4261

0.4352

0.4306

Logistic Regression, Char TF-IDF

0.9845

0.9844

0.9844

LGBM, Char TF-IDF

0.9893

0.9892

0.9891

AdaBoost, Char TF-IDF

Table 4. displays our results from testing every model. We applied 5-fold cross validation
when testing and used one of three sets of features for models to train upon. The three feature
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sets consist of Char tf-idf, Engineered, and Engineered RFE. Engineered signifies all six features
were used while Engineered RFE denotes that only character count, average word length, and
number of spaces were used as features.
Overall, our engineered features performed poorly with most achieving a F-1 score of
0.42. This may be due to a lack of ability for our features to capture the statistical makeup of the
text itself. Meanwhile, the models that used Char tf-idf as a feature yielded extremely strong
results with logistic regression managing to reach a 0.98 F-1 score. We attribute this high
performance to the ability of Char tf-idf to capture the important character n-grams that are
frequently modified in significant ways when an evasion scheme is applied.
Our best performing models consist of Random Forest, Support Vector Machine, and
Light Gradient Boosting Machines (LGBM), a new variant of gradient boosted decision trees.
These models achieved strong results which we consider to be a result of these models’ ability to
leverage changes in statistical information and makeup when comparing different attacks.

VII. Conclusion and Future Work
Our results strongly suggest that evasion schemes employed on lexical data can be
reliably defeated and effects minimized. Of each attack that we addressed, none were resilient
enough to break a generically crafted defense. In crafting each defense, we leveraged the
important requirements of any evasion scheme, the need for preserving meaning and readability,
to defeat them. We strongly push for any future defenses to factor in this property of evasion
schemes.
Furthermore, we demonstrated the viability of using pre-processing defenses to reverse
the effects of attacks. While training defenses were also effective at mitigating attacks, they only
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outperformed their pre-processing counter in one instance in an insubstantial manner. Preprocessing defenses require minimal computational power and time in comparison to training.
However, training is simpler to implement since it only involves training on pre-attacked data
while pre-processing defenses required a level of ingenuity to create.
The hardest attacks to defend against were those that affected the tokenization of words.
Both the CBA and the whitespace removal attacks fall into this category; they yielded some of
the strongest results. This suggests that tokenization is an important factor in the proper
operation of hate speech detection models regardless of whether the model is word or characterbased.
Our newly proposed attack, CBA, outperformed every attack created by [6]. We attribute
this to how attack can affect properties that both character-based and word-based models utilize,
statistical makeup and tokenization. Due to the importance of both these properties, we suggest
that future defenses aim to preserve these two properties .
We suggest several directions for future work. One direction involves the classification of
evasion schemes. In both this work and in [6], the issue of classifying attacked data was never
addressed. Although we may have an effective defense for each attack, properly applying them is
another problem. Some defenses such as GGNR may cause a false positive if applied to neutral
text which highlights the need for proper classification before applying the defense. In other
cases, there will be a waste of computational resources if defenses are applied on benign data.
Another direction for future work is the development of more robust or specialized
software for the defenses that required apis. In the case of GGNR and WSNR, both relied on
external apis that would solve a subproblem for them. Through our experiments, we found that
we replacing the APIs with either more specialized functions or robustness in general yielded
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significant performance boosts to our defenses. The detection of words violating grammar rules
and word segmentation are significant problems in themselves and thus warrant further research.
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